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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




DANIEL M. DROZDOWSKI, 
                                        Appellant,
             v.
NORTHLAND LINCOLN MERCURY
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 04-cv-756)
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Amy Reynolds Hay
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 26, 2009
Before:   RENDELL, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  April 1, 2009)
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Daniel Drozdowski sued Northland Lincoln Mercury (“NLM”) for discriminating
and retaliating against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43
    The parties consented to trial before the Magistrate Judge. 1
    There is conflicting testimony as to whether Drozdowski requested time off with the2
generalized comment quoted here or whether he specifically said he needed the time to
obtain professional counseling and treatment for a psychological problem.  Drozdowski
testified that he indicated to Moshholder that he needed time off to receive treatment.  
(App. at 196.)  Moshholder testified, however, that Drozdowski requested time off “to get
his act together” and never mentioned that he had a psychological problem or that he
needed the time off to seek mental health counseling.  (App. at 485-87.) 
2
Pa.C.S.A §951 et seq., after the car dealership laid him off.  Following trial before a
Magistrate Judge , the jury returned a verdict for NLM.  Now, Drozdowski appeals the1
verdict and seeks review of the denial of his motion for a new trial.  On appeal, he argues
that the District Court responded to a jury question with an instruction that rendered the
verdict “inconsistent with substantial justice.”  (Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9.)  Because
the instruction was proper, we will affirm the verdict and the order denying the motion for
a new trial. 
I. Background
Prior to working for NLM, Drozdowski was a technician at Northland Ford, Inc., a
car dealership and service center.  While in Northland Ford’s employ, he had a history of
absences and tardiness.  He met with his supervisor, Loren Moshholder, and requested
time off “to get his act together.”   (App. at 196.)  He was treated by a counselor and was2
diagnosed as having major depressive condition with anxiety.  After returning to work,
Drozdowski failed to report to his supervisor either the diagnosis or that he was
continuing to seek treatment.  Also, he never attributed his tardiness or absenteeism to a
3mental health condition.  Drozdowski continued to report to work late and was given a
final warning.  A few months later, he was fired for his unauthorized absences and
tardiness.  
Drozdowski was subsequently hired as a technician at Premier Lincoln Mercury,
where his tardiness and absence problems continued.  That dealership never disciplined or
threatened to discharge him, but, less than a year after Drozdowski began working there,
Premier Lincoln Mercury was acquired by Cameron Jones, the same man who owned
Northland Ford.  The new owner gave the dealership the Northland name, and, two
months later, discharged Drozdowski, citing reduction in expenses as the reason. 
Drozdowski then filed the present suit against NLM. 
During its deliberations, the jury sent out a note asking, “[D]oes ADA require the
employer to go to the employee and ask for medical support and/or what accommodations
are needed or does the employee have a duty to present support and a request specifically
stating the problem and what is needed?”  (App. at 574.)  The Court took argument from
counsel before crafting a response, which was, “Under the ADA or the Americans with
Disabilities Act, an employee must request an accommodation from the employer.”  (App.
at 604, 620.)  Shortly thereafter, the jury returned a verdict for NLM.  
4II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the ADA claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367.  We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
When we review a challenged jury instruction, the basis of the challenge
determines the appropriate standard of review.  United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252,
1260 (3d Cir. 1995).  If the appellant challenges the court’s statement of the legal
standard, we exercise plenary review.  Id. (citations omitted).  If the challenge is that a
jury instruction is potentially confusing, we review the trial court’s expression for abuse
of discretion.  Id. at 1264 (citations omitted).  In so doing, “[w]e must consider ‘whether,
viewed in light of the evidence, the charge as a whole fairly and adequately submits the
issues in the case to the jury.’”  Id. (quoting Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir.
1987)). 
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, unless the
denial is based on the application of a legal precept, in which case our review is plenary. 
Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
III. Discussion
A plaintiff can establish a discrimination case under the ADA by proving that his
employer either took adverse action against him because of his disability or failed to make
reasonable accommodations for his known disabilities.  Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist.,
5184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999).  To prove an adverse-action claim, a plaintiff must
show that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, that he was qualified to perform
the essentials of his job, with or without an accommodation, and that he suffered an
adverse employment action because of his disability.  Id..; Gaul v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 134
F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). 
To prove a reasonable-accommodation claim, a plaintiff must show that his
employer failed to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless the [employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the employer].”  42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306.  The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
employer knew of his disability and desire for an accommodation for that disability.
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313. 
Drozdowski is adamant that he brought an ADA adverse-action claim against
NLM, not a reasonable-accommodation claim.  Nevertheless, during closing argument,
his counsel repeatedly asserted that Drozdowski had asked his employer for an
accommodation, particularly for time off to seek treatment for his disability, and that his
employer had denied his request.  During closing arguments, for example, Drozdowski’s
counsel made the following assertion:  “Mr. Drozdowski tells you in his testimony ...
[t]hat he has a significant disease and illness.  That he disclosed it to Mr. Jones and Mr.
6Moshholder in February of ‘01.  He says he’s got to go for treatment.  Asks for thirty
days.  Doesn’t get it.”  (App. at 539.)  Several similar assertions were made during the
course of the argument.  (App. at 530-32, 537, 539.)  In so arguing, of course, counsel
was treating Northland Ford and NLM as if they were and always had been one and the
same business.  Whatever the motivation for taking that tack, it produced the jury’s
predictable curiosity about accommodations and the quoted question, which, again, was
“[D]oes ADA require the employer to go to the employee and ask for medical support
and/or what accommodations are needed or does the employee have a duty to present
support and a request specifically stating the problem and what is needed?”  App. at 574.)
The Court conferred at length with counsel concerning how to respond. 
Drosdowski’s counsel argued vigorously that the Judge should simply instruct the jury to
review the jury instructions and verdict form.  The Court, however, reasoned that the jury
had asked a legitimate question about the law and provided a concise answer:  “Under the
ADA or the Americans with Disabilities Act, an employee must request an
accommodation from the employer.”  (App. at 604, 620.) 
Now, Drozdowski argues that the response to the jury’s question was a substantial
error because it led the jury to believe that a plaintiff must request an accommodation to
succeed in an ADA adverse-action claim, when that requirement only applies to
reasonable-accommodation claims. It is unclear from Drozdowski’s brief whether he
contends that the response to the jury’s question was a misstatement of the law or whether
7he challenges the response on the grounds that it confused the jury.  His argument,
however, is unpersuasive either way. 
As a matter of law, the Court’s response was correct: when accommodations are at
issue in an ADA claim, the burden is on the employee or a representative to inform the
employer of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.  Taylor, 184 F.3d at 213
(“What matters under the ADA are not formalisms about the manner of the request, but
whether the employee or a representative for the employee provides the employer with
enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to
know of both the disability and desire for an accommodation.”).  Although the response
to the jury could have been more precise, it did, when viewed in context, fairly and
adequately answer the question. 
As to potential jury confusion, there is real irony in the allegation.  While
Drozdowski is correct that a plaintiff does not need to request an accommodation to
succeed on an ADA adverse-action claim, his argument takes the Court’s response out of
the context in which it was given, a context his counsel helped create.  The jury asked
whether the employee of the employer is responsible for asking about an accommodation. 
It was a legitimate question raised by the questions and arguments raised on
Drozdowski’s behalf.  The Court’s answer was not a general statement of the law, like
most jury instructions; it was a direct response to a specific question.  Moreover,
Drozdowski’s counsel could have but did not make any constructive suggestions for
     After the Judge announced her proposed response, Drozdowski’s counsel requested3
that she add the following language: “you also have in your possession the charge and
please remember this case is against Northland Lincoln Mercury, not against Northland
Ford.”  (App. at 608.)  This proposed addition did not address the jury’s legal question
and was not included.   
8
clarifying or limiting the answer.   He merely insisted that no answer be given except a3
direction to re-read the instructions.  Having had a leading role in raising the issue and
having provided no productive suggestion of how to deal with it, we are unpersuaded by
Drozdowski’s attempt to take the District Court’s answer out of context and claim it led
to a denial of substantial justice.     
Finally, in denying Drozdowski’s motion for a new trial, the Court noted the hand
that Drozdowski had in bringing up the issue of accommodations.  It then reasoned that,
in light of how the issue arose, the response to the jury’s question was appropriate and
there was no basis for granting a new trial.  We agree and conclude that there was no
abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.  
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the verdict and the order denying the
motion for a new trial. 
